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The European Union (EU) has historically sought to influence environmental policies of other 
countries through multilateral environmental agreements. Under its 7th Environmental Action Plan 
and Trade for All strategy it now seeks to extend its environmental policy projection through trade; 
its recent free trade agreements now contain chapters addressing environment and sustainable 
development. However, by adopting high environmental standards the EU can also advance its own 
economic interests suggesting an ambiguous motivation. The recent Korean, Japanese and Canadian 
FTAs and the Mercosur agreements are examined in order to place the extent of this environmental 
turn within the context of economic advantage. The finding is that while environmental protection 
provisions in these FTAs may have environmental benefits, they may also serve EU domestic economic 
interests. This motivation has implications for new FTA negotiations, such as those with New Zealand 
and Australia, and now the UK. 
Keywords: Environment, environmental policy, free trade agreement; sustainable development; 
international trade, EU trade policy 
Introduction 
Although the European Union’s (EU2) internal environmental protection regime is 
widely seen as one of its more demonstrable successes,3 its external environmental 
protection projection might be questioned. Historically, the EU was a laggard in 
addressing environmental issues beyond its borders; transboundary acid-rain and 
ozone layer depletion in the 1980s are examples.4 It subsequently recognised the 
regional implications of managing larger environmental issues, such as transboundary 
air pollution, and watercourses and lakes and the governance arrangements required 
 
1 Acknowledgements - This paper reports on findings made as part of the Jean Monet Project on NZ EU FTA and 
Brexit funded by the European Commission. Suggestions from an anonymous reviewer on an earlier draft of this 
paper are appreciated. 
2 For simplicity, EU is used to denote the European Union and its precursors, the European Economic 
Community and the European Community. 
3 Andrea Lenschow and Carina Sprungk, "The Myth of a Green Europe," Journal of Common Market Studies 48, 
no. 1 (2010); Anthony R Zito, Charlotte Burns, and Andrea Lenschow, "Is the Trajectory of European Union 
Environmental Policy Less Certain?," Environmental Politics 28, no. 2 (2019). 
4 Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 2nd ed. (Harvard 
University Press, 1998); Rachel Emma Rothschild, Poisonous Skies: Acid Rain and the Globalization of Pollution 
(Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 2019); Jeffrey McNeill, "Process and Participation in the European 





to address them.5 More recently again the EU has recognised that many of the pressing 
environmental challenges of our time, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, 
have a global dimension requiring an international level of cooperation and policy 
alignment.  
In response, the environment has become one of the primary values enshrined in the 
EU Treaties, establishing it as a shared competency. The Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) not only establishes the internal market, but also identifies sustainable 
development and a high level of protection and improvement of the environment as 
objectives.6 Title XX Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
confirms the EU’s competence in environmental matters and states EU goals, 
principles and criteria. Importantly, ‘environment’ is not defined, meaning that it  can 
be and is widely interpreted, giving it a chameleon-like character legally.7 
Environment is additionally captured under ‘sustainable development’.8 Today, 
environmental protection driving member states’ environmental legislation is 
embedded in some 365 regulatory acts addressing pollution and nuisance and some 
1,300 others covering the broader environmental realm.9 
The EU’s environmental policies and regulations also affect non-member states, given 
impetus by the TEU requiring the EU ‘in its relations with the wider world to uphold 
and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It 
shall contribute to… the sustainable development of the Earth.’ It has sought to realise 
these ambitions historically through multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)10 
– a signatory to 44, including 13 relating to nature and biodiversity, and the 2016 Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change.11 It also has sought to project its policies bilaterally 
using incentives and punishments such as conditional market access; capacity 
building, finance and other forms of support to third countries; and through dialogue 
and negotiations.12 This ambition is projected in the seventh Environment Action Plan, 
Living Well, Within the Limits of our Planet (7th EAP) published in 2013. Its priority 
objectives include helping ‘the Union address international environmental and climate 
challenges more effectively.’13 It also calls for mainstreaming environmental and 
climate-related considerations in its trade and development policies. In particular, 
trade policies should support achieving environmental and climate goals and provide 
 
5 Kai Schulze and Jale Tosun, "External Dimensions of European Environmental Policy: An Analysis of 
Environmental Treaty Ratification by Third States," European Journal of Political Research 52, no. 5 (2013). 
6 Article 3 TEU. 
7 The European Union Committee; House of Lords, Brexit: Environment and Climate Change. 12th Report of 
Session 2016-17 HL109 ([UK] House of Lords, 2017). 
8 Article 11 TFEU. 
9 Nicholas de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014); Ludwig Krämer, "30 Years of EC Environmental Law: Perspectives and Prospectives," Yearbook of 
European Environmental Law 2 (2002); The European Union Committee; House of Lords, Brexit: Environment 
and Climate Change. 12th Report of Session 2016-17 HL109. 
10 Angela Liberatore, "Problems of Transnational Policymaking: Environmental Policy in the EC," European 
Journal of Political Research 19 (1991)., Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, "Green Power? European Normative Influence 
on Chinese Environmental Policy," Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 11, no. 1 (2019); 
Schulze and Tosun, "External Dimensions of European Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Environmental 
Treaty Ratification by Third States." 
11 European Commission, "International Issues: Multilateral Environmental Agreements," 
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/agreements_en.htm. 
12 Diarmuid Torney, Katja Biedenkopf, and Camilla Adelle, "Introduction: European Union External 
Environmental Policy," in European Union External Environmental Policy: Rules, Regulation and Governance 
Beyond Borders, ed. Camilla Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf, and Diarmuid Torney (Palgrave MacMillan, 2018). 
13 European Parliament and Council, "7th Environment Action Plan ‘Living Well, within the Limits of Our 
Planet’," Official Journal of the European Union (2013). 




incentives to other countries to upgrade and enforce their environmental regulatory 
frameworks and standards. 
This intent is reflected in the 2015 Trade for All strategy that seeks a more responsible 
trade and investment policy in negotiating trade agreements that seek to safeguard 
internal environmental protection as well as promoting high environmental standards 
and sustainable development.14 To do so, the EU has exploited provisions in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which although generally seeking a reduction 
in trade barriers globally, provides for individual states to control trade for 
phytosanitary and environmental protection, provided these controls are applied 
uniformly.15 As a consequence, recent European Union free trade agreements address 
environmental protection explicitly in dedicated environment chapters  as well as 
under the broader umbrella of sustainable development provisions. 
Yet there remains a gap between act and intent that brings into question the EU’s 
motivation for promoting environmental protection through its trade agreements. 
Despite a plethora of environmental laws – now some eight percent of all EU laws – 
the EU’s own environmental performance has been decidedly mixed. Member state 
compliance has been inconsistent,16 while failure to achieve environmental quality 
objectives has been particularly noticeable in the agricultural sector, an important 
negotiating element in many foreign trade agreements. Overall, European agricultural 
indicators for biodiversity show an increase in farm size and arable cropping17 with 
consequent adverse impacts on water quality and biodiversity,18 resulting in ongoing 
environmental degradation.19 Essentially, Europe’s environment is being treated as a 
cheap factor of agricultural production. 
Its international projection of environmental protection, too, has been mixed. It is 
perhaps telling that Norway has ratified more United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe MEAs than the EU.20 One, the 1985 Helsinki Protocol on the Reduction of 
Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, was not 
signed by the EU, though 15 member states are parties; a direct consequence of  the 
UK, then a major emitter of sulphur from burning coal, abstaining.21 The EU showed 
a similar reluctance to engage initially with global ozone-layer protection initiatives 
promoted by the United Nations Environmental Programme in the 1980s.22 In both 
cases the EU has been shown to be primarily interested in protecting particular 
 
14 European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy (Luxembourg: 
European Commission, 2015). 
15 Kurt Hübner, Anne-Sophie Deman, and Tugce Balik, "EU and Trade Policy-Making: The Contentious Case of 
Ceta," Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017); [WTO] Agreement on Agriculture. 
16 Tanja Börzel, Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why There Is (Not) a ‘Southern Problem’ 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market. 
17 Guy Pe'er et al., "EU Agricultural Reform Fails on Biodiversity," Science 344, no. 6188 (2014). 
18 Stefan Schüler and Eva Maria Noack, "Does the Cap Reflect the Population's Concerns About Agricultural 
Landscapes? A Qualitative Study in Lower Saxony, Germany," Land Use Policy 83 (2019). 
19 Ian J. Bateman and Ben Balmford, "Public Funding for Public Goods: A Post-Brexit Perspective on Principles 
for Agricultural Policy," ibid.79 (2018); David Kleijn, Frank Berendse, and Niels Gilissen, "Agri-Environment 
Schemes Do Not Effectively Protect Biodiversity in Dutch Agricultural Landscapes," Nature 413, no. 18 October 
(2001); Pe'er et al., "EU Agricultural Reform Fails on Biodiversity." 
20 Schulze and Tosun, "External Dimensions of European Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Environmental 
Treaty Ratification by Third States." 
21 Rothschild, Poisonous Skies: Acid Rain and the Globalization of Pollution; Peringe Grennfelt et al., "Acid Rain 
and Air Pollution: 50 years of Progress in Environmental Science and Policy," Ambio (2019). 





industries from external regulation. Although somewhat historic, such reluctance to 
act suggests self-regarding rather than altruistic motives. 
Such ambivalence is not surprising given the uncomfortable relationship between 
trade and the environment. Trade policy seeks to reduce regulation to ease movement 
of goods, while environmental protection typically imposes regulations that restrict 
such movement. It has long been argued that differentials in environmental standards 
between trading partners invite a regulatory race to the bottom as capital is 
incentivised to relocate to less regulated regimes and governments are motivated to 
relax regulation to retain and attract that capital, the 'Delaware effect'.23 Simply, 
governments allow firms to externalise some of their costs of production onto the 
environment to protect industry to increase their competitiveness.  
To some extent, the regulatory race to the bottom has not eventuated, Rather, both 
domestic producers and consumers have been incentivised to encourage their 
governments to maintain high regulatory standards – the ‘California effect’.24 In this 
scenario affluent consumers seek psychic benefit from products produced to high 
ethical, environmental or human health standards. In part it is successful because 
environmental protection is for many (Western) firms a small part of their production 
costs compared to labour, while compliance measures impose costs on importers and 
act as barriers to trade.25 Further, firms benefit as front-runners where high domestic 
standards act to penalise foreign competition. 
Firms in third countries are consequently forced to adopt these high standards for 
their products to enable them to export into these markets, regardless of their own 
domestic regulations. These regulatory barriers are most likely to affect products of 
which significant quantities are exported from countries with weaker environmental 
or other standards to nations with stricter ones. The New Zealand wine industry 
provides an excellent example of regulatory transfer; the New Zealand government’s 
Overseas Market Access Requirements (OMAR) for wine exports explicitly apply 
rigorous EU standards to all exported wine.26 
There is also a legitimacy dimension, the need for broad public acceptance of 
international trade, a need identified in Trade for All. Public concern about the 
environmental and social implications of globalisation and trade has increased, 
surfacing in Europe during the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) negotiations between the EU and the USA.27 The TTIP was seen by civil society 
as likely to reduce regulatory barriers, including European environmental 
legislation.28 Unresolved, environmental concerns help undermine the public 
legitimacy of the trade agreements. 
 
23 David Vogel, "Trading up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and Environmental Protection," 
Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 4 (1997). 
24 "Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration," Journal of International Economic Law 3, no. 2 
(2000); ibid. 
25 Evgeny Postnikov, "Environmental Instruments in Trade Agreements: Pushing the Limits of the Dialogue 
Approach," in European Union External Environmental Policy: Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond 
Borders, ed. Camilla Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf, and Diarmuid Torney (Palgrave MacMillan, 2018). 
26 Henrietta McNeill, "She’ll Be Right: Some Observations on Diffused European Union Standards in a New 
Zealand Context," Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 6, no. 1 (2014). 
27 Gracia Marín Durán and Elisa Morgera, Environmental Integration in the Eu's External Relations : Beyond 
Multilateral Dimensions, Modern Studies in European Law (Oxford, [U.K.]: Hart Publishing, 2012). 
28 Ferdi De Ville and Gabriel Siles-Brügge, TTIP: The Truth About the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (John Wiley & Sons, 2015). 




The California effect therefore suggests domestic industries, together with civil society, 
will seek to maintain high standards in trade agreements, but for quite different 
reasons, serving simultaneously to restrict imports and maintain domestic values. 
Indeed, part of EU nervousness around Brexit is that UK producers decoupled from 
EU regulations and therefore able to produce goods more cheaply could undermine 
European producers’ internal market competitiveness. At the same time, UK civil 
society and producers are railing against importing USA’s ‘chlorinated chicken’, 
symbolic of the USA’s lower food safety and animal welfare standards , and cheaper 
produce expected to result from any trade deal between the two countries.29 
The EU by adopting the ‘California’ negotiating position, would project the EU’s 
environmental values and bolster trade agreement legitimacy among Europeans. 
Nevertheless, the EU’s history in environmental matters together with the 
fundamental tension between trade and environmental protection suggest the 
inclusion of environmental controls in FTAs may also serve also to protect European 
industry. This paper now considers whether environmental provisions in EU FTAS can 
be seen to be economically motivated as well as promoting environmental protection. 
It does this by examining recent environment and sustainable development provisions  
in recent FTAs to see whether alternative readings can be made for their intent. The 
possibility of such a self-serving motivation gains saliency in the context of the current 
negotiations for free trade agreements between the EU with Australia and New 
Zealand, and with the UK. 
Environmental dimensions of EU trade policy 
At the core of EU economic integration is the internal market based on free movement 
provisions promoting access to different national markets and on the absence of 
distortion of competition – that formed the original intention of the EU, i.e. 
deregulation. The internal market was concerned with liberalising trade flows. In 
contrast, environmental policies are largely regulatory and therefore hinder trade. The 
EU first sought to harmonise environmental regulation in order to avoid distortions of 
competition within the economic community, seeking to avoid the Delaware effect. It 
has also sought to address legitimacy concerns while pursuing an aggressive bilateral 
trade liberalisation agenda in order to gain access to new markets by incorporating 
environmental provisions in its FTAs.30  
A fundamental tension therefore exists between the EU’s internal market goals and 
environmental law. The EU’s economic integration is based on a single internal  market 
based on the free movement of goods and the absence of distortion of competition, 
achieved through regulatory liberalisation. Its environmental protection regime in 
contrast largely concerns the protection of vulnerable natural resources through 
regulation, resulting in spatial differentiation.31 
 
29 e.g. Shraddha Kaul, "Accommodating US Trade Demands Risks Creating a Dangerous Two-Tier Food System," 
British Poultry Council, https://www.britishpoultry.org.uk/accommodating-us-trade-demands-risks-creating-a-
dangerous-two-tier-food-system/. 
30 Alberta Sbragia, "The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence in the Management of 
Globalization," Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 3 (2010). 
31 de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market, liii; "Free Movement of Goods and 
Environmental Product Standards. Jean Monnet Working Paper Series: Environment and Internal Market 





Environmental instruments in EU trade agreements have evolved significantly, 
moving from multilateral to bilateral agreements each with a legally binding chapter 
on sustainable development: environment provisions in earlier agreements (e.g. South 
Africa, signed in 1999; Chile, in 2002) are not legally binding and lack penalties or 
enforcement. The new generation, signalled with the 2006 European Commission’s 
communication, Global Europe: Competing in the World, signalled a move to bilateral 
agreements.32 The new FTAs contain legally binding chapters on sustainable 
development, stress the importance of MEAs and agree not to game domestic 
environmental protection regulations for economic advantage.33 
The EU has also set out an agenda for responsible trade and investment in its Trade 
for All strategy.34 As well as promising greater economic value to smaller enterprises 
and transparency in negotiations, the strategy calls for the European Commission to 
adopt a negotiating approach that ‘involves using trade agreements and trade 
preference programmes as levers to promote, around the world, values like sustainable 
development human rights, fair and ethical trade and the fight against corruption’ and 
extends interest across the production chain. It also promotes corporate social 
responsibility, and consumer information on the environmental aspects of goods and 
services in promoting sustainable development. 
The Korean, Canadian and Japanese FTAs are all examples of the ‘new’ generation of 
EU FTAs.35 They cover a broad range of trade liberalisation issues and seek to integrate 
markets to give depth. They are also ‘competitiveness-driven’ compared to the earlier 
ones that had a strong emphasis on development issues and targeted developing 
countries. 
The EU-South Korea FTA is the first of these FTAs. It has been provisionally applied 
from July 2011 and was ratified in December 2015. It goes further than any previous 
agreements in lifting trade barriers and was also the EU's first trade deal with an Asian 
country. The EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement entered into force on 1 
February 2019, negotiations having begun in 2013. The EU-Japan FTA is the most 
‘traditional’ of the new FTAs, focusing on tariff reductions of motorcars, electronics 
and agricultural products. Consequently, it has been relatively uncontested.36 The 
Canadian-EU FTA, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), 
finalised in 2016, in contrast was notable for its comprehensiveness and for 
recognising global supply. The South American EU-Mercosur trade agreement was 
only agreed on 1 July 2019 and is now being ratified by EU member state 
parliaments.37 
All these FTAs address environmental matters, primarily through a Trade and 
Sustainable Development (TSD) chapter. They show an evolution in writing and 
structure but are broadly similar in content (Table 1). They are based on the premise 
that increased trade should not come at the expense of the environment or labour 
 
32 Commission of the European Communities, Global Europe: Competing in the World (Com(2006) 567) 
(Brussels, 2006). 
33 Postnikov, "Environmental Instruments in Trade Agreements: Pushing the Limits of the Dialogue Approach." 
34 European Commission, Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy. 
35 Annmarie Elijah et al., eds., Australia, the European Union and the New Trade Agenda (Canberra: ANU Press, 
2017); Finn Laursen and Christilla Roederer-Rynning, "Introduction: The New EU FTAs as Contentious Market 
Regulation," Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017). 
36 Hitoshi Suzuki, "The New Politics of Trade: EU-Japan," ibid. 
37 Mercosur is a customs union consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is a full 
member but has been suspended since 1 December 2016. 




conditions but should promote sustainable development. They reference MEAs, such 
as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) and the UNCED Agenda 21, as well as climate change agreements, such 
as the Paris Agreement. The FTAs also commit the parties to promoting corporate 
social responsibility and responsible business conduct in line with international 
guidance such as that proposed by the OECD and the UN.38 
Table 1: Environment and sustainable development topics in recent EU FTAs (sections and 









Environment     X 
Freshwater 13.5 1.9 Rights and 
obligations 
16.8  










International Trade in 
Endangered Species 
- 24.10 wrt timber 
species 
16.6.1 X 
Sustainable forestry and 
timber 
- 24.10 16.7 X 
Sustainable fisheries - 24.11 16.8  





Ch.13 Ch.22 Ch.16 Ch.14 
Agenda 21 13.1 22.1.1 16.1.1 - 
Climate change  24.9 mitigation 
technology 
 X 










   X 
Civil society dialogue 13.1.13 22.5 16.16  
Corporate social 
responsibility 
Annex 13(d) 22.3.2(b) 16.5(e) X 
     
1Full agreement is not yet available; all references are identified generally in Chapter 14 Trade and Sustainable Development. 
The Mercosur agreement has only been agreed in principle. However, its Trade and 
Sustainable Development chapter is intended to maintain the standards established in 
other modern agreements such as those with Mexico and Japan. The expectation is 
that increased trade should not come at the expense of the environment or labour 
conditions, but rather should promote sustainable development: 
The Parties agree that they should not lower labour or environmental standards 
in order to attract trade and investment. They also agree that the trade 
agreement should not constrain their right to regulate on environmental or 
labour matters, including in situations where scientific information is not 
conclusive.39 
 
38 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework (New York and Geneva: 
United Nations, 2011). 





In addition to more general matters, these FTAs all address concerns about trade-
related aspects of natural resource use, some specific to individual negotiating 
partners. These include biodiversity, forests, and fisheries. The Japanese FTA, for 
example, addresses particularly migratory fish stocks and responsible fisheries; 
combatting illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. CETA ring-fences water 
in its natural state, ‘considered neither a good nor product, and parties have a right to 
protect and preserve their natural water resources, with no obligation to permit 
commercial use’. It also puts restrictions on used car imports into Canada, presumably 
for maintaining air quality. 
The Mercosur agreement includes commitments to fight deforestation, implicitly 
referencing clearing of the Amazon rainforests. Private sector initiatives strengthen 
these commitments, for example not to source meat from farms in recently deforested 
areas. The Trade and Sustainable Development chapter includes commitments 
regarding the sustainable management of forests and illegal logging as well as on 
responsible business conduct. It safeguards relevant initiatives on sustainable 
agriculture, including EU private-sector actions on zero deforestation supply chains 
and producer-led initiatives, such as the soy moratorium in Brazil to limit the 
expansion of soy plantations in forestland. 
To ensure transparency, the FTAs contain mechanisms for civil society oversight by 
providing for civil society forums that are consulted by the EU. EU civil society 
representation oversight is provided in turn by domestic advisory groups (DAGs), 
committees of the EU’s European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).40 EESC 
consists of the different sectors of ‘organised civil society’ including environmental 
campaigners and so can be expected to run an environmental legitimacy rule over FTA 
performance. For example, CETA establishes a Civil Society Forum consisting of 
representative of civil society organisations that convene annually in order to conduct 
a dialogue on the sustainable development aspects of the Agreement. The parties shall 
promote a balanced representation of relevant interests, including independent 
representative employers, unions, labour and business organisations, environmental  
groups, as well as other relevant civil society organisations as appropriate. 
Member states can also provide a check at the ratification stage of agreements that 
include ‘mixed agreement’ matters, which under the TFEU all member states must 
agree for the deal to proceed. This check was first demonstrated when Belgium’s 
regional Walloon parliament initially refused to ratify CETA in 2016, demanding 
stronger safeguards on labour, environmental and consumer standards. The 
importance of environmental objectives in FTAs has more recently been clearly 
demonstrated when nearly all parties in the Austrian parliament’s European Union 
subcommittee rejected the proposed EU-Mercosur agreement in June 2019. The 
Austrian veto was in protest at Brazil’s environmental policies and an epidemic of 
forest fires in the Amazon basin.41 France and Ireland also threatened to vote against 
the deal. Such checks were likely unanticipated when negotiations were initiated, but 
with implications for designing future agreements. 
 
40 European Commission, "Implementation of the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapter in Trade 
Agreements - TSD Committees and Civil Society Meetings," European Commission, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1870. 
41 "Austrian Parliament Rejects EU-Mercosur Pact," Reuters 2019. 





The modern FTAs show that environment and sustainable development are now 
features of contemporary EU trade agreements. Their impact could be thought to be 
symbolic, largely reaffirming commitments to existing MEAs and UN protocols and as 
such might be seen to restate the status quo. Nevertheless, some aspects suggest a 
more assertive positioning that also serve EU internal industry interests. 
The IUU fishing provisions in the Japanese and more latterly Brazilian FTAs reinforce 
EU regulations introduced to give effect to various UN agreements to ensure 
sustainable management of marine resources.42 A sustainable marine fishery is 
desperately needed with a third of the world’s fisheries overfished.43 However, the EU 
and Japan, together with the USA, fish most of the world’s marine waters and consume 
a third of the world’s marine fish.44 They all subsidise their fishing fleets, which in no 
way deals to overfishing. 
The EU has taken the high moral high ground on tropical forestry, for example, in the 
7th EAP and Mercosur FTA reflecting the International Tropical Timber Agreement 
(1994). However, meeting these requirements raises the entry level for otherwise 
cheaper timber from tropical forests that could threaten expensive EU forestry. The 
requirement for sustainable forestry and protection of endangered tree species in the 
Canadian FTA could also be interpreted as a nod towards protecting European 
forestry. Similarly, Austria and other member states may balk at ratifying the 
Mercosur FTA because of uncontrolled Brazilian tropical forest burning. Brazil’s forest 
fires threaten biodiversity and impact on climate change. But it also creates grazing 
land the country’s beef production to increase. The veto may well have conveniently 
delayed larger volumes of South American beef entering the EU market. Austrian 
farmers, with their high level of relatively expensive organic produce, might well 
welcome impositions on cheap Brazilian meat. 
The traffic is not all one way. The Canadian FTA, for example, exempts removing 
controls of imports of used vehicles that do not conform to Canada’s safety and 
environmental requirements.45 Automobile manufacturing is one of Canada’s largest 
industrial sectors albeit only a seventh of the EU in production. Banning cars with 
smoky exhausts may help keep Canadian air quality high, but it also keeps cheaper 
foreign competition out of the Canadian market. 
The requirements to engage with civil society reflects EU’s domestic legitimacy 
concerns, but the DAGs may struggle to engage with reciprocating peak civil society 
organisations in partner countries. Postnikov regards the meetings as having been 
somewhat toothless, noting for example that those required by the earlier Chile FTA 
were irregular, partly reflecting the lack of a developed environmental NGO presence 
in Chile.46 Orbie et al., examining labour, found success varied widely. Some of their 
 
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (2008); United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982); 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995).  
43 FAO, The State of World Fisheries 2018: Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals  (Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2019). 
44 Wilf Swartz et al., "Sourcing Seafood for the Three Major Markets: The EU, Japan and the USA," Marine 
Policy 34, no. 6 (2010). 
45 CETA Article 2.11 (4)(a). 





respondents considered them a ‘fig leaf’ or ‘talking shop’, while others were more 
optimistic about its potential to empower marginalised groups with the EU’s trading 
partners.47 While beyond the scope of this paper, younger activist environmental 
groups may not seek to engage with established peak bodies, potentially reducing the 
meetings’ future legitimacy.48 
Future agreements 
Regardless of their motivation, the inclusion of environment and sustainable 
development chapters in EU FTAs has implications for negotiating future FTAs, such 
as those underway with New Zealand and Australia, and now the UK. For many years, 
New Zealand’s agriculture has been able to claim an environmental moral ascendency, 
with its ‘clean, green’ image in comparison with those many industrialised countries 
with their intensive farming. However, eutrophication and general degradation of 
freshwater bodies and systems, biodiversity loss, and greenhouse gas emissions, 
primarily from intensive (dairying) farming operations now dominate popular 
discourse.49 Such concerns are backed up by a recent state of the environment report 
that explicitly links New Zealand’s environmental degradation with agriculture.50 At 
first blush either sides might use environmental policy as a bargaining chip in the EU-
New Zealand FTA negotiations. However, both sides are disadvantaged by their 
environmental records and state meaning little leverage is possible.51 Furthermore 
New Zealand has little countervailing power. Additionally, a change in government 
resulted in New Zealand adopting a more ambitious climate change policy regime, 
culminating in the Zero Carbon Act 2019 removing a potential EU leverage point. 
Nevertheless, there are wider implications that New Zealand and other countries need 
to be aware of. They need to be cognisant of the possibility for new environmental 
issues to be incorporated within EU trade policy – the inclusion of trade in the 7th EAP 
is such a warning. Perhaps more importantly, they need to recognise that trade has 
shifted over time with new constellations of actors being empowered as the EU project 
evolves. Notably, the European Parliament has been increasingly empowered to the 
point where it can now block trade agreements. Additionally, member states are now 
required to sign off on comprehensive trade agreements, given some elements are 
shared competencies with the EU, as the Mercosur veto by Austria has shown. This 
underlines the appearance of new, second-order negotiating parties to the FTAs. They 
have different constituencies who in turn have different agendas than in the past. They 
also have veto power. The extent of participation depends on the scope of the FTA and 
whether it includes shared competency matters that require member state agreement. 
 
47 Jan Orbie, Lore Van den Putte, and Deborah Martens, "Civil Society Meetings in EU Free Trade Agreements: 
The Purposes Unravelled," in Labour Standards in International Economic Law, ed. Henner Gött (Springer, 
2018). 
48 For example, in New Zealand, the youth-led ‘Generation Zero’ organization, cited by the Minister for Climate 
Change as providing impetus for that country’s Zero Carbon Act 2019 does not belong to nor seeks membership 
of New Zealand’s established peak environmental body, the Environment and Conservation Organisation  (ECO). 
Jenny Coatham, "The Young Climate Activists Who Broke through to the Halls of Power," The Spinoff, 
https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/12-11-2019/how-a-group-of-young-climate-activists-broke-through-to-the-
halls-of-power/?fbclid=IwAR3NR2gXlJaCL3qjYlRf7EEwlx2rQNxL9soSIyInhEjxqXCUetSRydgI-sQ.. 
49 Mike K. Joy, Squandered. The Degradation of New Zealand's Freshwaters, (2015), 
https://freshwaternz.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/squandered.pdf. 
50 Ministry for the Environment and Stats NZ, New Zealand’s Environmental Reporting Series: Environment 
Aotearoa 2019 (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment and Stats NZ, 2019). 
51 Pers. Comm. Negotiating official, June 2019. 




Negotiating an environment and sustainable development chapter in an EU-UK FTA 
might altogether be more challenging. New Zealand has shown itself, for example with 
the wine OMAR, to be prepared to accept and step up to EU regulations – it had little 
choice given its negotiating position of weakness as a small importer into a large EU 
market. The UK Brexit rhetoric in contrast is partially framed around relaxing the high 
EU internal environmental regulatory level – conjuring up the Delaware effect. Such a 
position would challenge EU producers, consumers and civil society so that the EU has 
no negotiating legitimacy if it were to accede to the British negotiating demands. 
Environmental concerns are now an established element of current trade negotiations, 
though scope and enforceability vary. These concerns are in response to increasing 
discourse about potential environmental costs of globalisation. They can be expected 
that these will continue and consolidate – with possibility for strengthening in the 
future when agreements are reviewed. They also have public and/or organised civil 
society reviews built into the FTAs where protagonists can articulate these concerns. 
At the present these forums appear to have had little traction, remaining ‘talk shops’, 
but the potential remains for them to be increasingly leveraged in the future by astute 
civil society organisations. The EU has a strong environmental regulatory framework, 
with a wide public support. How this evolves in the future and is unclear, but they may 
provide impetus for demanding change by the EU’s trading partners. The EU has 
clearly sought to emulate the California effect in its negotiations: the ‘new’ FTAs may 
indeed seek to export EU environmental policies and values bilaterally, but 
environmental quality may not be the only goal their environment provisions advance. 
References 
"Austrian Parliament Rejects EU-Mercosur Pact." Reuters, 2019. 
Bateman, Ian J., and Ben Balmford. "Public Funding for Public Goods: A Post-Brexit 
Perspective on Principles for Agricultural Policy." Land Use Policy 79 (2018): 293-
300. 
Benedick, Richard E. Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet 
2nd ed.: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
Börzel, Tanja. Environmental Leaders and Laggards in Europe: Why There Is (Not) 
a ‘Southern Problem’. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. 
Coatham, Jenny. "The Young Climate Activists Who Broke through to the Halls of 
Power." The Spinoff, https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/12-11-2019/how-a-group-of-
young-climate-activists-broke-through-to-the-halls-of-power/?fbclid=IwAR3-
NR2gXlJaCL3qjYlRf7EEwlx2rQNxL9soSIyInhEjxqXCUetSRydgI-sQ. 
Commission of the European Communities. Global Europe: Competing in the World 
(Com(2006) 567). Brussels 2006. 
de Sadeleer, Nicholas. EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 
———. "Free Movement of Goods and Environmental Product Standards. Jean 
Monnet Working Paper Series: Environment and Internal Market 2017/3." Brussels: 
University of St Louis, 2017. 
De Ville, Ferdi, and Gabriel Siles-Brügge. Ttip: The Truth About the Transatlantic 





Elijah, Annmarie, Donald Kenyon, Karen Hussey, and Pierre van der Eng, eds. 
Australia, the European Union and the New Trade Agenda. Canberra: ANU Press, 
2017. 
European Commission. "Implementation of the Trade and Sustainable Development 
(TSD) Chapter in Trade Agreements - TSD Committees and Civil Society Meetings." 
European Commission, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1870. 
———. "International Issues: Multilateral Environmental Agreements."  
https://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/agreements_en.htm. 
———. New EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement in Principle, 1 July 2019. 2019. 
———. Trade for All: Towards a More Responsible Trade and Investment Policy. 
Luxembourg: European Commission, 2015. doi:10.2781/472505. 
European Parliament, and Council. "7th Environment Action Plan ‘Living Well, 
within the Limits of Our Planet’." Official Journal of the European Union (2013). 
FAO. The State of World Fisheries 2018: Meeting the Sustainable Development 
Goals. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2019. 
Ferenczy, Zsuzsa Anna "Green Power? European Normative Influence on Chinese 
Environmental Policy." Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies 
11, no. 1 (2019): 18-40. 
Grennfelt, Peringe, Anna Engleryd, Martin Forsius, Øystein Hov, Henning Rodhe, 
and Ellis Cowling. "Acid Rain and Air Pollution: 50 years of Progress in 
Environmental Science and Policy." Ambio (2019). 
Hübner, Kurt, Anne-Sophie Deman, and Tugce Balik. "EU and Trade Policy-Making: 
The Contentious Case of Ceta." Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 
843-57. 
Joy, Mike K. Squandered. The Degradation of New Zealand's Freshwaters. 2015. 
https://freshwaternz.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/squandered.pdf. 
Kaul, Shraddha. "Accommodating Us Trade Demands Risks Creating a Dangerous 
Two-Tier Food System." British Poultry Council, 
https://www.britishpoultry.org.uk/accommodating-us-trade-demands-risks-
creating-a-dangerous-two-tier-food-system/. 
Kleijn, David, Frank Berendse, and Niels Gilissen. "Agri-Environment Schemes Do 
Not Effectively Protect Biodiversity in Dutch Agricultural Landscapes." Nature 413, 
no. 18 October (2001): 723-25. 
Krämer, Ludwig. "30 Years of Ec Environmental Law: Perspectives and 
Prospectives." Yearbook of European Environmental Law 2 (2002): 155-82. 
Laursen, Finn, and Christilla Roederer-Rynning. "Introduction: The New EU FTAs as 
Contentious Market Regulation." Journal of European Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 
763-79. 
Lenschow, Andrea, and Carina Sprungk. "The Myth of a Green Europe." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 48, no. 1 (2010): 133-54. 
Liberatore, Angela. "Problems of Transnational Policymaking: Environmental Policy 
in the Ec." European Journal of Political Research 19 (1991): 281-305. 




Marín Durán, Gracia, and Elisa Morgera. Environmental Integration in the EU's 
External Relations : Beyond Multilateral Dimensions. Modern Studies in European 
Law. Oxford, [U.K.]: Hart Publishing, 2012. 
McNeill, Henrietta. "She’ll Be Right: Some Observations on Diffused European 
Union Standards in a New Zealand Context." Australian and New Zealand Journal 
of European Studies 6, no. 1 (2014): 16-26. 
McNeill, Jeffrey. "Process and Participation in the European Parliament: The F-Gas 
Directive." Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies 3, no. 1-2 (2005): 7-27. 
Ministry for the Environment, and Stats NZ. New Zealand’s Environmental 
Reporting Series: Environment Aotearoa 2019. Wellington: Ministry for the 
Environment and Stats NZ, 2019. 
Orbie, Jan, Lore Van den Putte, and Deborah Martens. "Civil Society Meetings in EU 
Free Trade Agreements: The Purposes Unravelled." In Labour Standards in 
International Economic Law, edited by Henner Gött, 135-52: Springer, 2018. 
Pe'er, Guy, L. V. Dicks, P. Visconti, R. Arlettaz, A. Báldi, T. G. Benton, S. Collins , et 
al. "EU Agricultural Reform Fails on Biodiversity." Science 344, no. 6188 (2014): 
1090-92. 
Postnikov, Evgeny. "Environmental Instruments in Trade Agreements: Pushing the 
Limits of the Dialogue Approach." In European Union External Environmental 
Policy: Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders, edited by Camilla 
Adelle, Katja Biedenkopf and Diarmuid Torney, 59-79: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018. 
Rothschild, Rachel Emma. Poisonous Skies: Acid Rain and the Globalization of 
Pollution. Chicago, Il.: University of Chicago Press, 2019. 
Sbragia, Alberta. "The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence in 
the Management of Globalization." Journal of European Public Policy 17, no. 3 
(2010): 368-82. 
Schüler, Stefan, and Eva Maria Noack. "Does the Cap Reflect the Population's 
Concerns About Agricultural Landscapes? A Qualitative Study in Lower Saxony, 
Germany." Land Use Policy 83 (2019): 240-55. 
Schulze, Kai, and Jale Tosun. "External Dimensions of European Environmental 
Policy: An Analysis of Environmental Treaty Ratification by Third States." European 
Journal of Political Research 52, no. 5 (2013): 581-607. 
Suzuki, Hitoshi. "The New Politics of Trade: EU-Japan." Journal of European 
Integration 39, no. 7 (2017): 875-89. 
Swartz, Wilf, U. Rashid Sumaila, Reg Watson, and D. Pauly. "Sourcing Seafood for 
the Three Major Markets: The EU, Japan and the USA." Marine Policy 34, no. 6 
(2010): 1366-73. 
The European Union Committee; House of Lords. Brexit: Environment and Climate 
Change. 12th Report of Session 2016-17 HL109. [UK] House of Lords, 2017. 
Torney, Diarmuid, Katja Biedenkopf, and Camilla Adelle. "Introduction: European 
Union External Environmental Policy." In European Union External Environmental 
Policy: Rules, Regulation and Governance Beyond Borders, edited by Camilla 





United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect 
and Remedy" Framework. New York and Geneva: United Nations, 2011. 
Vogel, David. "Environmental Regulation and Economic Integration." Journal of 
International Economic Law 3, no. 2 (2000): 265-79. 
———. "Trading up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and 
Environmental Protection." Journal of European Public Policy 4, no. 4 (1997). 
[Wto] Agreement on Agriculture. 
Zito, Anthony R, Charlotte Burns, and Andrea Lenschow. "Is the Trajectory of 
European Union Environmental Policy Less Certain?". Environmental Politics 28, 
no. 2 (2019): 187-207. 
 
 
 
 
